University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiCen

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

7-6-1988

Reflections On Secretary Of State Shultz's Two-day
Excursion In Central America
Deborah Tyroler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen
Recommended Citation
Tyroler, Deborah. "Reflections On Secretary Of State Shultz's Two-day Excursion In Central America." (1988).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen/2202

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiCen by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 074643
ISSN: 1089-1560

Reflections On Secretary Of State Shultz's Two-day
Excursion In Central America
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Wednesday, July 6, 1988
As articulated by James LeMoyne of the New York Times (07/05/88), Secretary of State George
Shultz's visit to Central America last week "appeared to be a renewed effort to isolate Nicaragua
at a time when the Reagan administration is perceived to be weakening and its policy toward the
Sandinistas is seen to be in disarray, according to diplomats and government officials in the region."
The governments of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica were reportedly reassured
of US support, while requested to participate in a US plan to apply political pressure on Nicaragua.
Shultz reiterated the Reagan administration line that the region's main problem is "marxist
subversion" from Nicaragua and guerrilla activities, rather than the poverty, extreme social injustice
and militarism afflicting a large majority of the Central American population. Unnamed government
officials in the region cited by LeMoyne said Shultz asked the foreign ministers from the four
nations to meet with him on Aug. 1 at a location in Central America to discuss a united diplomatic
effort to isolate the Sandinistas. The meeting would occur just prior to another summit of all five
Central American presidents. While the summit is still uncertain, news accounts have mentioned
Aug. 7 as a possible date. San Salvador is considered a likely location. Costa Rican President Oscar
Arias has not been willing to be perceived as a close ally of the Reagan administration. If Arias
moves closer to Washington in the near future, Nicaragua will face greater isolation. An unnamed
senior Costa Rican official said in an interview with the Times that his government was agreeable
to a meeting with Shultz on Aug. 1. But the official said Costa Rica continued to believe further
progress was possible if the US would support new talks between the contras and the Nicaraguan
government. "We still think the Sandinistas are willing to give more than they have," the official
said. "We don't believe the possibility of negotiation has been exhausted." As pointed out by
LeMoyne, Shultz's focus on Nicaraguan compliance with the regional peace accord tends to ignore
the non-compliance of other countries. Honduras continues to support the contras. Guatemala and
El Salvador have failed to open broad-based negotiations with respective rebel groups. According
to Mary McGrory of the Washington Post (07/05/88), Shultz has little or nothing to show for his trip.
"The fact that Shultz was accompanied by Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary of state, provided all
the evidence needed that he was not down there to make peace." David B. Ottaway, a Washington
Post staff writer (07/03/88), describes the Shultz foray as evidence that the Reagan administration
appears to have "launched a search for a fallback diplomatic strategy to keep the rebels alive and
pressure the Soviet-backed Sandinista government in ways other than military force." Abrams
told reporters in Guatemala City after Shultz's meeting on the evening of June 30 with the nine
contra political and military leaders that "a program of pressures" on the Sandinistas was needed
to persuade them to keep their promises of democratic reform and "to reinvigorate the diplomatic
track." Among the ideas Abrams mentioned were more trips to the region by Shultz, additional
pressure from Nicaragua's immediate neighbors and the US Congress on the Sandinistas, and an
intensified campaign of public diplomacy to discredit and isolate the Nicaraguan government.
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